Automatic and Precise Dimensional Analysis by d'Amorim, Marcelo et al.
Automatic and Precise Dimensional Analysis
Marcelo d’Amorim, Mark Hills, Feng Chen, and Grigore Ros¸u
Department of Computer Science
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
201 N Goodwin Ave, Urbana, IL 61801,
{damorim, mhills, fengchen, grosu}@cs.uiuc.edu
Abstract. The loss of NASA’s Mars climate orbiter [5] is evidence of the
importance of units of measurement as a safety policy for software in gen-
eral and for scientific applications in particular. In this paper we present
a static analysis technique that detects violations of the unit policy. The
technique relies on domain-specific unit annotations inserted in the code,
either manually or automatically with the support of a tool, which are
verified conservatively, i.e., all runtime unit errors are detected statically
using an automatic theorem prover. This paper informally compares our
approach with others, describes the technique in detail, and evaluates a
benchmark built of standard programs for unit analysis and important
fragments of NASA’s SCRover project code.
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1 Introduction
Units of measurement are employed in various ﬁelds of science not only to assign
measures to quantities, but especially to constrain the axioms of mathematics
within which these quantities operate. In this paper we use (measurement) units
as a domain of analysis in order to frame the set of program executions inside a
safety envelope consisting of basic domain-speciﬁc unit consistency requirements.
We will refer to dimension as a domain classifying measurable values, e.g., dis-
tance, time, speed, weight, etc. A unit corresponds to a particular dimension and
makes it possible to measure quantities. For instance, meter is a particular unit
in the distance dimension, while second is a unit of time. This paper describes a
tool-supported technique for the static analysis of units of measurement, often
called dimensional analysis.
We recall the importance and non-trivial nature of dimensional analysis with
two notorious real-life failures. NASA’s Mars climate orbiter spacecraft crashed
into Mars’ atmosphere on 30 September 1999 due to a software navigation error.
Peer review indicated that one team used the English unit system (e.g., inches,
feet, etc.) while the other used the metric system for a key spacecraft operation
[5]. On 19 June 1985, the space shuttle Discovery ﬂew upside down over Maui
during an experiment in an attempt to point the mirror to a spot 10,023 feet
above sea level. This number was supplied to the onboard guidance system, which
unfortunately was expecting units in nautical miles [33]. These two failures and
possibly many others could have been avoided by using dimensional analysis
tools like the one presented in this paper.
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Overview. Our technique relies on the generation of veriﬁcation conditions
(VCs) using the standard weakest-precondition semantics [23, 15, 21]. In addi-
tion to constraints on actual values of the program, the VCs we generate also
contain constraints on the units associated to program variables. The combina-
tion of concrete and abstract domains in the VC is made necessary because of
the existence of operators producing new units, in particular the operators for
multiplication and division, whose evaluation can become assigned to variables
in the program. For this reason, the veriﬁcation condition can contain units of
the form (unit x)exp, where unit x denotes the unit of a variable in the program
and exp an expression in the language. For instance, the geometric mean pro-
cedure, (gmean) in Figure 1, requires an invariant unit tmp == (unit x)j ∧ ...,
where tmp is the temporary computing the product, x is the input array, and j
the loop induction variable. Proofs are carried out modulo the axioms of units
using an automatic (non-interactive) [34, 14] theorem-prover.
It is worth noting that the user is not forced to annotate every program loop
with unit assertions. This is the case, for instance, when the variables in a loop
do not change units (which is the case for all our previous attempts [12, 36]).
These pre-deﬁned patterns as well as “simple” unit constraints can be automat-
ically generated in a processing step that runs before the analysis. As pointed
out in [12, 36] this is not suﬃcient to show the previous example unit safe, but
is enough for checking unit safety without annotations on a class of programs,
including all those that could be analyzed by our previous techniques. The fol-
lowing example shows the generation of unit constraints by a pre-processor for
the assignment x = a ∗ (c + d). The operands of an addition must agree in
their units while a multiplication generates a unit which is the product of the
units of the operands. This new unit becomes “assigned” to the unit of x. The
unit safety of arithmetic operators is then expressed via annotations generated
automatically in the program. The command havoc assigns an arbitrary unit
to an identiﬁer. Note that we translate (also automatically) the program into
3-address code to facilitate the generation of annotations.
let int x1 , int x2 in {
x1 = a ; havoc unit(x1) ; assume unit(x1) = unit(a) ;
assert unit(c) = unit(d) ;
x2 = c + d ; havoc unit(x2) ; assume unit(x2) = unit(c) ;
x = x1 * x2 ; havoc unit (x) ; assume unit(x) = unit(x1) unit(x2) ;
}
Related Work. Numeric types associate to polymorphic dimension parameters
in [35], avoiding dimension and unit errors. A formal veriﬁcation method is
proposed in [25] to incorporate, infer and check dimension types in an extension
of ML, and, in [26], a parametricity theorem is given stating that the behavior
of a program is independent of the units used. In our work, we explore the
possibility, unfulﬁlled by type-checker based approaches, that programs might
change units of variables and still be unit safe. A simple example of the limitation
of typed approaches is the calculation of the geometric mean of the sequence
of values {ai}ni=1 given by (Πni=1ai)1/n. A program that computes the mean
usually deﬁnes a temporary variable to accumulate the intermediate values of
the product. Assuming all values in the sequence have unit u, the unit of the
temporary variable will therefore change n− 1 times before the n-th root of the
temporary is taken, leaving a ﬁnal value with unit u. A type-checker assigns a
single, possibly parametric, unit, say u, to variables and therefore will reject the
possibility of the temporary in the example above having units u, u2, ..., un. Our
technique is capable of analyzing such admittedly useful programs and thus will
not reject them as dimensionally inconsistent.
Frameworks can assist in the consistent use of units via libraries of frequently
used units with basic arithmetic operations and conversions between them. Such
a lightweight approach can be practical for simple applications with a ﬁxed
number of units, however, it requires signiﬁcant programming eﬀort because all
arithmetic operations need to be performed via procedure calls. Unfortunately,
libraries can only support a fixed number of units (as their associated types
are statically deﬁned), which is inconvenient. The assumption that only a ﬁxed
number of units are needed can be misleading since a simple multiply and assign
statement such as x = x ∗ y can change the unit associated to x.
Yet another approach is to make use of the existing type system of a language
by translating accesses to variables of primitive types annotated with units into
accesses to objects whose classes correspond to units, i.e, primitive values are
boxed inside special unit objects. Two works in this category are [4, 8], where
a new language providing support for dimensions and units is introduced. This
approach has the advantage in comparison to the framework-based approach in
the automation of code generation for enforcing the consistent use of unit oper-
ations. However, [4] suﬀers from the fact that only a ﬁnite number of units can
be used in programs – 300 “common” units are deﬁned as classes with several
hundred arithmetic operations between them in methods. While [8] allows an
inﬁnite number of units, it cannot cope with the possible change of units at
runtime without over-generalizing the unit type, which causes a loss of informa-
tion about the exact unit type of an object. Also, [8] requires an entirely new
language, making it more challenging to examine existing applications for unit
policy safety violations. It is important to mention that despite the fact that we
use a simpliﬁed language for demonstrating our technique, we do not pose any
language requirement (we rely on annotations which are ignored by compilers).
We have previously deﬁned a measurement unit static checker for units of BC
[12] and C [36] programs using symbolic execution. Similarly to type-checking
[25] it reports spurious warnings when proving facts that involve variables whose
units change as in the geometric mean example. In this paper, we introduce
a tool-supported technique that is able to detect all unit violations that our
previous attempts detected and yet allows variables to change units consistently.
In particular, we will be able to analyze the geometric mean example correctly,
that is, without reporting any violation.
Some Background. We begin by showing the basic algebraic properties of
units. The algebraic structure of units forms an abelian group:
Definition 1. An abelian group is comprised of an operator and a set of
elements, and satisfies the following properties for any of its elements A, B, C.
Closure: the product AB is a group element, Associativity: A(BC) = (AB)C,
Identity: there is an identity element I s.t.AI = IA, Inverse: every element A
admits an inverse A−1 s.t. AA−1 = I, and Commutativity: for any two group
elements A and B, AB = BA.
Note that the product of two units, here denoted by concatenation, gives
a diﬀerent unit (e.g. meter seconds is a derived unit from meter and second),
the order of units in a product is irrelevant, there exists a unit identity – from
hereon called noUnit – and for any unit u we can always calculate its inverse
u−1 because we have a power operator. Furthermore, the product of two units is
commutative (e.g. meter seconds = seconds meter) which ﬁnally illustrates that
the unit algebra comprised of product and power operators, the special unit
noUnit, and a set of unit constants indeed forms an abelian group. It is known
that uniﬁcation in an abelian group is a decidable problem [10]. Kennedy [26]
then showed a type-checker for ML augmented with units. We explore the fact
that the algebra of units forms an abelian group, but take a diﬀerent approach
than type-inference/checking to assure unit safety of programs.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the analysis of units,
Section 3 presents an initial implementation, Section 4 shows the evaluation of
our implementation and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Analysis of Units
In contrast to type-checker [35, 26] and framework based [22, 29, 4] techniques
our analysis allows variables to change units multiple times via assignment as
long as the assigned expressions remain unit consistent along the execution of
the program. We believe that programs whose variables change are quite com-
mon and not considering this will lead to a signiﬁcant number of false alarms.
Furthermore, in contrast to the techniques mentioned above and also to those
based on symbolic execution [12, 36] we also take into account the concrete values
associated to program variables in order to give more precision to our analysis.
As exposed in [12, 36] using symbolic execution, it is often the case that local
unit assertions are not suﬃcient to show the entire program unit safe. Consider,
for instance, that a variable, say x, has its unit changed inside a loop. A unit
violation must be raised in an expression such as x+E occurring after the loop
if x and E cannot be proved to have the same unit. As usual, safety of loops
needs to be characterized by the existence of ﬁx-points, and unit invariants may
be required to prove their correctness. In the geometric mean example, we know,
partially from the invariant, that the unit of tmp after the loop is the unit of
x raised to the power of length and this is a necessary condition to calling the
root procedure and then proving the post-condition of gmean.
Unit annotations can be introduced manually but their generation is also
partially automated. The user might need to deﬁne unit invariants in order to
prove a particular procedure unit safe, but the tool also generates unit constraints
from the semantics of the program and the algebraic structure of units in order
to check for local unit misuse. These pre-deﬁned annotations together with a
conservative pattern for calculating the ﬁx-point of loops [36] might suﬃce to
prove several programs unit safe [12, 36] and substantially reduce the amount of
annotation needed to analyze a program.
The technique we present in this paper is concerned with the generation of
a ﬁrst-order predicate Q derived from a procedure with the property that if Q
is proved to be valid under certain assumptions then that procedure does not
contain unit errors. Otherwise, a violation could have happened and we issue a
warning pointing out the place in the code that might have caused the violation.
In contrast to approaches like ESC/Java which compromises soundness with
eﬃciency [17, page 235], we generate veriﬁcation conditions conservatively in
order to avoid missing true alarms. We pass a proposition of the form (P∧BG) →
Q as a proof task to the prover, where Q is a veriﬁcation condition derived
from a procedure involving not only constraints on the units of variables but
also on the concrete program values and characterizes the initial program state,
BG is a background predicate axiomatizing the abelian group algebra in the
particular domain of units, and P is the precondition of the analyzed procedure.
The proposition informally means that if the precondition holds then it must be
the case that Q must hold under the additional assumption of BG. Refutation-
based theorem provers, like Simplify [14], return a counter-example C with the
following properties [28]: C is satisﬁable, and C → ¬((P ∧BG) → Q). That is,
C expresses a way to refute the predicate passed to the prover. Refutation of a
proof task therefore corresponds to a safety violation. When a formula such as
C is found, the tool can give meaningful feedback to the user.
We ﬁrst present the command language we use in our analysis and its dynamic
semantics. We follow by presenting the algorithms to generate annotations and to
calculate VCs, showing the axioms of units which form the background predicate
for veriﬁcation, and the loop patterns which are useful for loops deﬁned without
an invariant. We show in a soundness theorem that the technique will not miss
real unit runtime errors. In the next section, we discuss an initial implementation
of these ideas which makes use of the Boogie veriﬁer [13]. Boogie acts as our
interface to the automatic theorem prover Simplify [14], and handles some of
the tasks needed for veriﬁcation, including generation of veriﬁcation conditions
and translation of the Simplify output into useful error messages.
2.1 The Core Language (CL)
Table 1 describes the EBNF of a simple proof-of-concept command language
whose programs are the objects of our analysis. It is important to mention that
we do not intend to introduce a language expressive enough to enable the trans-
lation of many real programming languages to it, but rather to expose a simple
language for demonstrating our technique. We believe that this language in-
cludes an important subset of features for conveying evidence that the presented
technique can be extended to modern languages. In this section we also describe
informally the dynamic semantics of this “core” language, CL for short.
Expressions of this language are side-eﬀect free and assumed to be given in
3-address form [6]. The language has integers, arrays of integers, and booleans as
denoted values. We assume that procedures come with pre and post-conditions
and anticipate that the analysis proceeds in a modular fashion, looking at one
procedure at a time. Therefore, function calls are translated to assert and assume
annotations in the callee site and recursion will not become an issue.
The symbol “+,” appearing in the exponent of terms denotes one or more
occurrence, separated by commas, of the elements in the mentioned syntactic
category. Placeholders appear underlined, and terminals in bold. The follow-
ing are the commands of the language: sequential composition, assignment to
a simple variable and to an array element, non-deterministic choice, arbitrary
assignment, local variable declaration, assertion, and assumption. A program is
a comma-separated sequence of procedures (Proc). The keyword result denotes
the return value of a procedure.
Variables are declared without initialization via a scoping command let. false
is assumed as the initial value for booleans, 0 for integers, and null for arrays.
The expression new int[id] allocates an array of size id. The only operations
involving arrays are assignment of an array to a variable, assignment of an array
element, and selection. CL has a call-by-value semantics even for arrays.
Proc ::= requires: AExp ensures: AExp Type proc Id(TypedId+,) { Com }
Com ::= Com ; Com | Id = Exp | Id [Id ] = Id | Com  Com | havoc (Id)
| let TypedId in { Com } assert (AExp) | assume (AExp)
Type := int | int[] | boolean | Unit
TypedId := Type Id
Id := “program identifiers”
Exp := “int. constants”{Unit}| Id | Id [Id ] | new int[Id ] | Id α Id , α ∈ {+,−, ∗, /}
AExp := AExp pop AExp | qu TId .AExp | ¬ AExp | (AExp) |Atom
Table 1. The EBNF for the core language.
The type Unit becomes necessary in order to quantify over the units of program
variables. The set of expressions includes integer literals annotated with units,
identiﬁers, array selection, array allocation, and arithmetic expressions.
The set of assertion expressions (AExp) is built from ﬁrst-order formulae.
The placeholder pop stands for one of the propositional operators, and qu for a
ﬁrst-order quantiﬁer.
Extended Assertion Language. We extend the assertion language of ﬁrst
order formulae on program variables with unit equality.
Definition 2. The set of atoms is defined as follows:
Atom ::= true | false | Exp ρ Exp | Unit==Unit
where ρ ranges over ==, !=, >,>=, <,<=.
Definition 3. The set of units is defined as follows:
Unit ::= noUnit | “constant unit” |Unit Unit |Unit ˆ (Exp) | unit(Id)
where the set of constant units includes meter, second, newton, and so forth;
concatenation denotes the product of two units, ˆ is the unit power operator,
and unit is an uninterpreted function denoting the unit of a variable. Note that
the power of a unit takes a program expression as argument. This construct
can express relationships between units and concrete program values, e.g. the
proposition unit (x) == unit (y) ˆ i relating the unit of x, the unit of y, and
the concrete value stored in the variable i.
From hereon we overload the command havoc for the uninterpreted func-
tion unit since the units of variables will also be treated “as” program variables.
In addition, havoc(id1 ...idn) is a shorthand for havoc(id1) ;...; havoc(idn) and
havoc(unit(id1...idn)) a shorthand for havoc(unit(id1)) ;...; havoc(unit(idn)).
Desugaring. Loops, branching, and procedure calls are not expressed in the
core language. They belong to a language extension of CL and are considered
syntactic sugar. A loop of the form inv:P while b do { c } translates to:
assert (P ) ;
(havoc(ids) ; havoc(unit(ids)) ; assume (P ∧b) ; c ; assert (P ) ; assume(false))
 (havoc(ids) ; havoc(unit(ids)) ; assume (P ∧ ¬b))
We ﬁrst check that the invariant holds in the loop entry. As we do not know in
the loop entry or exit the values assigned to the identiﬁers (ids) in the body, we
explicitly “discard” them with the command havoc. The ﬁrst block in the choice
assumes the invariant and the loop guard and then checks the invariant after the
execution of the body. We do not need any further check from this path if the
assertion is valid. On the other hand, the assumption made in the alternative
command on the choice will get propagated to the commands that will follow.
A conditional of the form if b then {c} else {c′} translates to assume(b) ;
c  assume(¬b) ; c′, and a function call of the form call id = id’(ids) translates
to assert(Pre ) ; havoc(id) ; assume(Post ) where Pre and Post are the pre
and post-conditions declared in the function named id’ and have occurrences
of formals properly substituted by actual parameters. In addition, we translate
language expressions and assertion expressions of the enriched language into
the 3-address form of CL in order to simplify the deﬁnitions that will follow in
this paper. Booleans are expressed in the language to allow the translation of
assertion expressions into 3-address form.
Example. The procedure gmean in Figure 1 calculates the geometric mean of
a sequence of values. It takes an array and the array length as parameters,
calculates the product of the sequence and then calls a second procedure, root,
to compute the root of the product. Note that the procedure root plays only
the role of an interface, i.e. its veriﬁcation will be trivially satisﬁed. As usual in
assume-guarantee reasoning, the pre and post-conditions of the called procedure
are taken into account to analyze the callee code.
This program is written in our CL extension. After going through a pre-
processing step consisting of the translation of control-ﬂow constructs, the ana-
lyzer instruments unit annotations, generates veriﬁcation conditions, and passes
a predicate derived from the VC to an automatic theorem-prover to be analyzed.
requires: length > 0 & unit(length) == noUnit
ensures: unit(result) == unit(x)
int proc gmean (int[] x, int length) {
let int j, int tmp in { tmp = 1 ;
inv: unit(tmp) == unit(x)^(j) & unit(j) == noUnit & j <= length
while (j < length) do { tmp = tmp * x[j] ; j = j + 1 } ;
result = call root(tmp, length)
} } ,
requires: unit(n) == noUnit & EXISTS Unit k . unit(pow) == k ^ n
ensures: unit(result) == unit(pow) ^ (1 / n)
int proc root (int pow, int n) { assume(false) }
Fig. 1. The geometric mean program.
2.2 Dynamic Semantics and Unit Errors
As a static bug-ﬁnding technique our purpose is to detect runtime errors at
compile-time. The dynamic semantics of CL characterizes the runtime behavior
of its programs including unit errors. Here we brieﬂy introduce the dynamic
semantics of CL, ignoring errors such as “array access out of bounds” that do
not relate to units. Later we show, in a soundness theorem, that the errors the
analyzer ﬁnds properly include the dynamic errors.
We present the semantics in a big-step style with two relations: ⇓e for ex-
pressions, and ⇓c for commands. A concrete environment Σv maps identiﬁers to
concrete values  , while a unit environment Σu maps identiﬁers to their units
. Maps support an update operation [ ← ], and ∅c and ∅u denote initial
(empty) concrete and unit environments, respectively. The arrow on expressions
relates a triple comprised of an expression, a concrete environment, and a unit
environment with a value-unit pair representing the result of evaluating the ex-
pression. We use the symbol error to denote an evaluation error in either relation
without risk of confusion, i.e. error belongs to the codomain of both relations.
The axioms below express the correct and incorrect evaluation of addition and
subtraction. The symbol α′ ranges over {+,−}:
〈id1 α′ id2, σv, σu〉 ⇓e 〈σv(id1) α′ σv(id2), σu(id1)〉 , σu(id1) = σu(id2)
〈id1 α′ id2, σv, σu〉 ⇓e error , σu(id1) = σu(id2)
The arrow on commands relates a triple comprised of a command, concrete
environment and unit environment with a tuple of concrete environment and
unit environment, denoting a new compound state. The satisfaction relation on
assertion expressions, denoted |=, takes the form σv, σu |= P and denotes the
satisfaction of P under concrete and unit environments σv, σu. The rules below
describe a correct assignment and an incorrect command sequence.
〈e, σv, σu〉 ⇓e 〈i, u〉
〈id = e, σv, σu〉 ⇓c 〈σv[id ← i], σu[id ← u]〉
〈c2, σv, σu〉 ⇓c error
〈c1; c2, σv, σu〉 ⇓c error
Appendix A details the semantics.
c ag(c)
c1 ; c2 ag(c1) ; ag(c2)
id = i{u} id = i ; havoc(unit(id)) ; assume(unit(id) == u)
id1 = id2 id1 = id2 ; havoc(unit(id1)) ;
assume(unit(id1) == unit(id2))
id1 = id2 α
′ id3, assert(unit(id2) == unit(id3)) ; id1 = id2 α′ id3 ;
α′ ∈ {+,−} havoc(unit(id1)) ; assume(unit(id1) == unit(id2))
id1 = id2 ρ id3, assert(unit(id2) == unit(id3)) ; id1 = id2 ρ id3 ;
havoc(unit(id1)) ; assume(unit(id1) == unit(id2))
id1 = id2 ∗ id3 id1 = id2 ∗ id3 ; havoc(unit(id1)) ;
assume(unit(id1) == unit(id2) unit(id3))
id1 = id2 / id3 id1 = id2 / id3 ; havoc(unit(id1)) ;
assume(unit(id1) == unit(id2) (unit(id3)ˆ (−1)))
id1[id2] = id3 assert(unit(id2) == noUnit)
assert ( unit(id1) == unit(id3)) ; id1[id2] = id3
c1  c2 ag(c1)  ag(c2)
let type id in {c1} let type id in { ag(c1) }
havoc(id) havoc(id)
havoc(unit(id)) havoc(unit(id))
assert(P ) assert(P )
assume(P ) assume(P )
Table 2. The annotation generation transformer.
2.3 Annotation Generation
This section describes the generation of unit annotations for “core” CL programs.
We perform a simple context-insensitive transformation to include the necessary
annotations for checking unit safety. Table 2 describes this annotation generation
algorithm via the command transformer ag : Com → Com. Note that, thanks
to the 3-address form, arithmetic operations only appear in assignments and
occur with at most one operator. This is also the case for relational expressions
built with the operator ρ derived from assertion expressions and conditionals.
The havoc command [17, 13] appearing in Table 2 will override the previous
value (unit, resp.) of the mentioned variable with an arbitrary one. Therefore,




c1 ; c2 wp(c1,wp(c2,Q))
id = e Q[id \ e]
id1[id2] = id3 Q[id1 \ {id1; id2 : id3}]
c1c2 wp(c1,Q) ∧ wp(c2,Q)
let type id FORALL id::type , id∗::Unit .
in {c} wp(c[unit(id) \ id∗],Q)
havoc (id) Q[id \ id∗] ∧ id∗== k
assert P P ∧Q
assume P P ⇒ Q
Fig. 2. The VC generator.
Figure 2 deﬁnes the axiomatic se-
mantic of CL with the predicate
transformerwpCom :AExp → AExp
calculating the weakest precondi-
tion of each command in Com.
This transformer gives an algo-
rithm to generate veriﬁcation con-
ditions of programs. The term
{id1; id2 : id3} denotes an array
id1 with the expression id3 assigned to the element indexed by id2. The substi-
tution operator [ \ ] for assertion expressions replaces every free occurrence of
an identiﬁer in a predicate by a given term. The symbols id∗ and k stand for fresh
names. The fresh variable k represents an arbitrary value (or unit). The fresh
name k in the deﬁnition of havoc will appear in the VC as a schematic variable.
Note that havoc(id) ; assume (id == ...) is not equivalent to assume (id ==
...) as the proposition id == ... can be falsiﬁed in some proof state, making the
path under veriﬁcation become trivially satisﬁed. Datatypes for integers, ﬁnite
maps (for arrays), and units are assumed in the object language.
2.5 The Axioms of Units ∀ u :: Unit . uˆ1 == u
∀ u :: Unit . uˆ0 == noUnit
∀ u :: Unit , m :: int , n :: int .
(uˆm)ˆn == uˆ(m ∗ n)
∀ u :: Unit , m :: int , n :: int .
(uˆm) (uˆn) == uˆ(m+ n)
∀ u1 :: Unit , u2 :: Unit , m :: int .
(u1ˆm == u2ˆn) ⇒ u1 == u2
∀ u :: Unit . u noUnit == u
∀ u1 :: Unit , u2 :: Unit , u3 :: Unit .
(u1 u2) u3 == u1 (u2 u3)
∀ u1 :: Unit , u2 :: Unit .u1 u2 == u2 u1
Fig. 3. Axioms of Unit.
Figure 3 presents an axiomatization
of the unit algebra. It lists several
axioms stating the equivalence of
units. Note from the second axiom
that noUnit is an identity in the
group. The last two axioms state as-
sociativity and commutativity prop-
erties. One alternative way to deﬁne
these axioms is using an already de-
ﬁned theory of groups. We preferred
to use this stand-alone theory in-
stead mainly because not every TP supports a theory for groups, e.g. Boo-
gie/Simplify [13]. We use typed ﬁrst-order logic as our object language. This
set of unit axioms together with the deﬁnition of the datatype Unit and its con-
stant inhabitants form a background predicate, BG, which is necessary to carry
out unit veriﬁcation [26, 12, 36, 8]. As one might expect the set of base individu-
als inhabiting the type Unit, e.g. meter, second, degree, etc., is ﬁxed but can be
extended without requiring modiﬁcation of the axioms of BG.
After generating unit annotations with the transformer ag, one can calculate
a veriﬁcation condition of a procedure using the predicate transformer wp. These
VCs are further augmented with the background predicate stated in Figure 3,
properly formatted to the syntax of an speciﬁc TP, and passed to an automatic
theorem prover for veriﬁcation. We assume as given a theory of ﬁnite maps and
integer arithmetic including equalities and inequalities as these are required to
prove the predicates derived from CL programs. The following theorem shows
that the analysis of commands are sound w.r.t. the dynamic semantics.
Soundness Theorem 1 For any CL command c, concrete environments
σv, σ′v, unit environments σu, σ′u, and predicate Q, 〈c, σv, σu〉 ⇓c
〈σ′v, σ′u〉 and σ′v, σ′u |= BG ⇒ Q if σv , σu |= BG ⇒ wp(ag(c),Q).
Proof. By structural induction on the syntax of Com. Take c to be c1; c2 then
from the deﬁnitions of ag and wp σv, σu |= BG ⇒ wp(ag(c1),wp(ag(c2), Q)).
As wp is a total function on Com, take Q′ to be wp(ag(c2), Q) then σv, σu |=
BG ⇒ wp(ag(c1), Q′), and by hypothesis 〈c1, σv, σu〉 ⇓c 〈σ′v, σ′u〉 and σ′v, σ′u |=
BG ⇒ Q′, i.e. σ′v, σ′u |= wp(ag(c2), Q), which establishes from the hypothesis
that 〈c2, σ′v, σ′u〉 ⇓c 〈σ′′v , σ′′u〉 and that σ′′v , σ′′u |= BG ⇒ Q. It follows from the
sequential composition rule (see Appendix A, Table 4) that 〈c1; c2, σv, σu〉 ⇓c
〈σ′′v , σ′′u〉. The other commands can be proved similarly.
The corollary that follows shows that our static analyzer does not miss unit
errors. Informally it says that if one can prove the VC generated for some proce-
dure valid under the assumption that the precondition holds and that the unit
axioms given are valid, then it should not be the case that any unit error will
be raised during the execution of the analyzed procedure.
Corollary 1 For any CL procedure with body c, pre-condition Pre and post-
condition Post, any concrete environment σv, and unit environment σu, 〈c ,σv ,
σu〉 ⇓ error and σv, σu |= Pre if |= Pre ∧BG ⇒ wp(ag (c),Post).
Proof. This follows as a special case of the Soundness Theorem. Assume valid the
predicate Pre ∧BG ⇒ wp(ag (c),Post) then one can discharge the assumption
Pre into a state σv, σu s.t. σv, σu |= Pre and σv, σu |= BG ⇒ wp (ag (c),Post).
Therefore, from the previous theorem, there exists some compound state σ′v, σ
′
u
s.t. 〈c, σv, σu〉 ⇓ 〈σ′v , σ′u〉 and σ′v, σ′u |= Post. Then error is unreachable.
2.6 Loop Patterns
We introduce loop patterns as a means to avoid the requirement for user-deﬁned
invariants in every loop by considering the possibility of the units remaining con-
stant across iterations. We believe that loops having this property are common
and a simple invariant like this should cover a large number of procedures. A
loop of the form while b do {c} translates to:
let t1 id
∗
1, ..., tn id
∗
n { assume(P ) ; inv: P while (b) do {c} }
where P stands for the expression unit (id∗1) == unit(id1) ∧ ... ∧ unit(id∗n)
== unit(idn), and id1, ..., idn are the variables assigned in the loop body. Recall
that we do not have side-eﬀects so this information can be easily collected. We
deﬁne “old versions” for these variables to save their associated units, i.e. the
unit of id∗1 will become the unit of id1 prior to the loop entry. The invariant then
states that no change in the unit of modiﬁed variables will occur in the body.
Therefore this is a safe approximation of the unknown unit loop invariant. In the
case units in fact change, an alarm will be raised allowing the user to redeﬁne
the assumed but incorrect invariant.
3 Verification Implementation
We showed how to translate a program with unit annotations into a ﬁrst order
formula stating unit safety. We illustrate next how these programs can be veriﬁed
in our initial implementation of the above concepts, which makes use of the
Boogie veriﬁer [13] which currently uses the refutation-based theorem-prover
Simplify. Boogie relies on its own speciﬁcation language and therefore makes
our task of generating VCs unnecessary.
The Boogie (Spec#) Verifier. Boogie [13] not only generates veriﬁcation
conditions eﬃciently [18] but also checks safety of programs modulo some user-
deﬁned axiomatic theory. The tool accepts a high-level typed imperative program
(speciﬁcation) in the BoogiePL language, generates VCs for each procedure
implementation, and calls the Simplify theorem prover [14] in order to check
for safety violations. The tool provides command-line options to output the
veriﬁcation conditions in the eﬃcient [18] form of passive commands, i.e. without
assignments, which could be possibly formatted for use in other theorem provers.
Boogie has been used as the veriﬁer for spec# and MSIL [11]. It has built-in
theories for ﬁnite maps and integer arithmetic. In addition, it is open to the
axiomatization of new theories. The possibility of deﬁning the algebra of units
in a high-level language within an environment integrated with the theorem
prover, and having the VCs generated eﬃciently were key factors for choosing
this tool to implement our technique. We show informally next the translation
of CL programs into BoogiePL.
Translating CL into BoogiePL. The axioms of units described in Figure 3
appear in the proof task associated with every translated CL program and aug-
ment the set of theories supported by the tool, which already includes ﬁnite maps
(necessary to handle arrays), partial orders (necessary to express constraints on
the subtyping relation), and integer arithmetic. Units are represented as ﬁnite
maps from base units to unit exponents, allowing each unit to be represented
in a canonical form. The BoogiePL language omits the choice command, and
includes procedure calls and labeled blocks together with a jump instruction.
For the variable id, we call id u the variable of type Unit implicitly associated
with id. It means that every declaration of a name, either locally or as a for-
mal parameter, spawns the declaration of a corresponding unit “variable”. The
signature of the procedure gmean, for instance, will be extended to take four
parameters, the original two plus their units. The declaration of a local variable
such as let id in {c} will translate to var id∗ : int , id∗u : unit ; τ(c[id\id∗])
where [ \ ] is a substitution operator, τ is a compiler taking sentences from CL
to BoogiePL, and var is the local declaration statement in BoogiePL. The
command c1  c2 translates to goto L1 , L2 ; L1 : τ(c1) ; goto L3 ; L2 :
τ(c1) ; goto L3 ; L3 : where L1, L2 and L3 are fresh identiﬁers denoting
labels in the program. The dynamic semantics of goto is to randomly choose
one ﬂow of control among those informed.
4 Evaluation
Our analysis goes through a pre-processing step of desugaring, annotation gen-
eration of the input CL program, and translation to a BoogiePL program.
Then, using the Boogie veriﬁer, a ﬁrst-order logic formula is built and passed
to the theorem-prover Simplify. The ﬁrst step consists of a sequence of pro-
gram transformations deﬁned using the equational logic [30, 31] fragment of the
high-performance rewriting system of Maude [2].
We show in Figure 4 the time spent with veriﬁcation of BoogiePL programs
with and without unit errors. We use Boogie shipped under the Spec# dis-
tribution version 0.6. We tested our programs on a Pentium M 1.73GHz with
512Mb RAM running WindowsXP Pro. The programs in this benchmark appear
in Appendix C. The program projectile appears in [12, 36] to determine the
angle to launch a projectile in order for it to hit a target. The program takes as
input weight, initial position, position of the target, speed, energy, and gravity.
An incorrect unit is assigned to the weight of the projectile leading to a unit
error in the procedure main. This error is found by the analyzer which was able
to identify the contract violated. The second and the third entry only consider
the time to analyze the procedure main on the projectile code. The fourth entry
show the time to analyze the entire projectile code. We have been able to analyze
the insertion sort procedure containing nested loops where the units of variables
remain unchanged.








Fig. 4. Benchmark showing the-
orem proving time in seconds.
The SCRover case. SCRover is a robot-
controlling system developed at the Univer-
sity of Southern California, using the Mis-
sion Data Systems (MDS) framework which
NASA JPL (Jet Propulsion Laboratory) will
use in their Rocky 7 rover to be sent to Mars
in the year 2009. In order to avoid system
errors caused by units of measurement, the
MDS framework provides a large library of
classes and constants to support units and
their conversions. The MDS framework does not perform a static analysis on
the program to catch unit errors. Instead, it relies on a few auxiliary classes to
perform consistent operations involving units.
Two out of three bugs which have been publicly reported in SCRover [4]
have been caused by the misuse of units of measurement. The following is a
report on the ﬁrst unit bug: “I assumed the atan function returned values in
degrees when it actually returned values in radians. Thus, the rover’s target
turn angle is higher than it should be” [4]. The second error is reported as:
“During the execution of a turn, the rover does a core dump. The problem is
that we are trying to compare a number vs. a number with a SI1 unit” [4].
We translated the functions that produced these errors, appearing as scrover1
and scrover2 in Figure 4, into CL. Some irrelevant details were removed in the
translation, e.g. output and command issuing functions. Our analyzer was able
to detect both bugs. The ﬁrst error is caused by a contract violation in the use
of a procedure. It is caught with a simple assert annotation placed in the return
of a call. The second is caused by the misuse of unit types and can be caught
with the instrumented unit assertions.
Our prototype implementation can be downloaded from our website [1].
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Motivated mainly by the extensive use of physical units in the development of
scientiﬁc applications, this paper describes a static analysis to check unit consis-
tency in programs built from a proof-of-concept language. Our technique starts
by instrumenting the program with annotations corresponding to assumptions
that must be made for operations to be considered unit consistent. It then cal-
culates, using a standard weakest-precondition semantics, a ﬁrst-order predicate
which includes propositions involving not only the values associated to program
1 The International System of Units[3].
variables but also their units. This gives more precision to our analysis at the
expense of requiring theorem provers to support a larger set of theories related
to the operations on concrete values of the program. We rely on automatic the-
orem provers equipped with those theories and demonstrate our technique with
the Boogie [13] analyzer against a benchmark including procedures known to
be diﬃcult to show unit safe and fragments of the NASA’s SCRover program,
which reports two unit errors.
In contrast to other approaches, this technique allows units associated to
variables to change. The geometric mean program is an example of a unit safe
procedure whose variables change units. In this technique, users can give unit
invariants to loops, therefore allowing one to show, in contrast to others [12],
that the geometric mean program is in fact unit safe. If invariants are not given
our tool will assume that units attached to variables remain unchanged across
loop iterations. This constitutes a conservative invariant.
We used the eﬃcient rewriting system of Maude to implement our program
transformations.Maude itself has an interactive theorem prover (ITP) [2] which
could possibly be tailored to be used as an automatic procedure for proving our
proof obligations if provided with specialized tactics and domain-speciﬁc rewrite
rules. Another possible direction would be to enrich automatic theorem provers
with an interface to Maude so that equational theories like that of BG (see
Figure 3) could be used eﬃciently by plugging functional modules into the TP.
Finally, we assume in the paper that invariants are given by the user when
needed, but we plan to use abstract interpretation techniques [9] and/or random
testing [16] to detect domain-speciﬁc invariants.
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Appendix A. Dynamic Semantics
We present the dynamic semantics in a big-step style with two relations: ⇓e for
expressions, and ⇓c for commands. A concrete environment Σv maps identiﬁers
to concrete values  , while a unit environment Σu maps identiﬁers to their
units . The arrow on expressions relates a triple comprised of an expression,
a concrete environment, and a unit environment with a tuple of a value and its
associated unit, which together denote the evaluation of an expression. Table 3
presents the relation ⇓e ⊆ 〈Exp, Σv, Σu〉 × 〈 ,〉 giving the semantics of CL
expressions. The arrow on commands relates a triple comprised of a command,
concrete environment and unit environment with a tuple of concrete environment
and unit environment, denoting the new compound state. Table 4 shows the
transition relation ⇓c ⊆ 〈Com, Σv, Σu〉 × 〈Σv, Σu〉.
Maps are supported by update [ ← ] and selection ( ) operations taking the
map as the ﬁrst argument and having the usual behavior. We use the symbol
error to denote an evaluation error in either relation without risk of confusion,
∅v and ∅u to characterize the initial states of the concrete and unit environment
maps, and ? to denote both arbitrary values and units. We use the satisfaction
relation |= on assertion expressions, taking the form σv, σu |= P , to denote
satisfaction of P under concrete and unit environments σv, σu. Furthermore, we
have a substitution operator [ \ ] for commands with the expected semantics.
We use the symbols n, i, i0, i1, ..., in to denote variables for integer literals
and values without risk of confusion, id, id1, ..., idn to denote program variables,
e, e1, ..., en expression variables, c, c1, ..., cn to denote command variables, and
P,Q to denote assertion expressions variables. The notation n : 〈0 : i0, ..., n− 1 :
in−1〉 represents an array value of size n. The selection operator ( ) is overloaded
for arrays. It expects an array value and an integer index within the array range
with noUnit attached. This operator associates to the left.
Table 5 presents the dynamic semantics of commands w.r.t. unit errors. In-
formally, error propagates via sequential composition, any assignment whose
expression raises a unit error will also raise an error, an error is raised in a
non-deterministic choice if any compound command raises an error, and ﬁnally
assume and assert have similar dynamic behavior.
Appendix B. More Related Work
Extended Static Checker for Java (ESC/Java) [17] is a static analyzer tailored to
ﬁnd not only common bugs such as array out of bounds and null dereference, i.e.
runtime errors, but also to check user-deﬁned assertions and object invariants de-
ﬁned in a syntax closely related to the Java Modeling Language (JML) [27]. The
tool calculates veriﬁcation conditions using the weakest precondition semantics
of a simple intermediate language to which Java programs are translated. Each
VC generated corresponds to a Java class method which can be annotated with
pre- and post-conditions, loop invariants, and assertions. The VCs are generated
so as to avoid exponential blow up in their size [18], traditionally caused by the
〈i{u}, σv , σu〉 ⇓e 〈i, u〉 〈id, σv , σu〉 ⇓e 〈σv(id), σu(id)〉
〈new int[id], σv , σu〉 ⇓e 〈n : 〈0 :0, ..., n − 1 :n− 1〉,noUnit〉 , σv(id) = n, σu(id) = noUnit
〈id1, σv , σu〉 ⇓e 〈n : 〈...〉, u〉 〈id2, σv , σu〉 ⇓e 〈i,noUnit〉
〈id1[id2], σv , σu〉 ⇓e 〈σv(id1)(i), u〉 , 0 ≤ i < n
〈new int[id], σv , σu〉 ⇓e error , σu(id) = noUnit 〈id1[id2], σv , σu〉 ⇓e error , σu(id2) = noUnit
〈id1 α′ id2, σv , σu〉 ⇓e 〈σv(id1) α′ σv(id2), σu(id1)〉 , α
′ ∈ {+,−}, σu(id1) = σu(id2)
〈id1 α′ id2, σv , σu〉 ⇓e error , α
′ ∈ {+,−}, σu(id1) = σu(id2)
〈e1, σv , σu〉 ⇓e 〈i1, u1〉 〈id2, σv , σu〉 ⇓e 〈i2, u2〉
〈id1 ∗ id2, σv , σu〉 ⇓e 〈i1 ∗ i2, u1 u2〉
〈id1, σv , σu〉 ⇓e 〈i1, u1〉 〈id2, σv , σu〉 ⇓e 〈i2, u2〉
〈id1/id2, σv , σu〉 ⇓e 〈i1/i2, u1 (u2 ˆ(−1))〉
〈id1 ρ id2, σv , σu〉 ⇓e 〈σv(id1) ρ σv(id2), σu(id1)〉 , σu(id1) = σu(id2)
〈id1 ρ id2, σv , σu〉 ⇓e error , σu(id1) = σu(id2)
Table 3. The transition relation for CL expressions.
〈c1, σv , σu〉 ⇓c 〈σ′v , σ′u〉 〈c2, σ′v , σ′u〉 ⇓c 〈σ′′v , σ′′u〉
〈c1; c2, σv , σu〉 ⇓c 〈σ′′v , σ′′u〉
〈e, σv , σu〉 ⇓e 〈i, u〉
〈id = e, σv , σu〉 ⇓c 〈σv [id ← i], σu[id ← u]〉
〈id1, σv , σu〉 ⇓e 〈n : 〈... σv(id2) : i ...〉, u〉
〈id1[id2] = id3, σv , σu〉 ⇓c 〈σv [id1 ← n : 〈... σv(id2) :σv(id3) ...〉], σu〉 , σu(id3) = u, σu(id2) = noUnit
〈c1, σv , σu〉 ⇓c 〈σ′v , σ′u〉
〈c1  c2, σv , σu〉 ⇓c 〈σ′v , σ′u〉
〈c2, σv , σu〉 ⇓c 〈σ′v , σ′u〉
〈c1  c2, σv , σu〉 ⇓c 〈σ′v, σ′u〉
〈c[id \ id∗], σv [id∗ ← false], σu[id∗ ← noUnit]〉 ⇓c 〈σ′v , σ′u〉
〈let boolean id in {c}, σv , σu〉 ⇓c 〈σ′v , σ′u〉 , id
∗ fresh
〈c[id \ id∗], σv [id∗ ← 0], σu[id∗ ← noUnit]〉 ⇓c 〈σ′v , σ′u〉
〈let int id in {c}, σv , σu〉 ⇓c 〈σ′v , σ′u〉 , id
∗ fresh
〈c[id \ id∗], σv [id∗ ← null], σu[id∗ ← noUnit]〉 ⇓c 〈σ′v , σ′u〉
〈let int[] id in {c}, σv , σu〉 ⇓c 〈σ′v , σ′u〉 , id
∗ fresh
〈havoc (id), σv , σu〉 ⇓c 〈σv [id ← ?], σu〉 〈havoc (unit(id)), σv , σu〉 ⇓c 〈σv , σu[id ← ?]〉
〈assert P, σv , σu〉 ⇓c 〈σv , σu〉 , σv , σu |= P 〈assume P, σv , σu〉 ⇓c 〈σv , σu〉 , σv , σu |= P
Table 4. The transition relation for CL commands.
〈c1, σv , σu〉 ⇓c error
〈c1; c2, σv , σu〉 ⇓c error
〈c2, σv , σu〉 ⇓c error
〈c1; c2, σv , σu〉 ⇓c error
〈e, σv , σu〉 ⇓e error
〈id = e, σv , σu〉 ⇓c error
〈id1[id2], σv , σu〉 ⇓e error
〈id1[id2] = id3, σv , σu〉 ⇓c error 〈id1[id2] = id3, σv , σu〉 ⇓c error , σu(id1) = σu(id3)
〈c1, σv , σu〉 ⇓c error
〈c1  c2, σv , σu〉 ⇓c error
〈c2, σv , σu〉 ⇓c error
〈c1  c2, σv , σu〉 ⇓c error
〈assert P, σv , σu〉 ⇓c error , σv , σu |= P 〈assume P, σv , σu〉 ⇓c error , σv , σu |= P
Table 5. The transition relation for CL commands leading to error.
assignment and choice commands, and are passed to the Simplify [14] automatic
theorem prover (TP). If the prover is able to prove the conjecture passed to it,
then no bug of the kinds checked have been detected. The system is unsound
and incomplete, i.e. only a subset of real bugs may be found and the proof can
be falsiﬁed without the existence of actual bugs. As we demonstrate in the paper
our technique is similar to the one employed in ESC/Java in many aspects. Our
novel contribution is the extension of an assertion language with unit constraints
and the deﬁnition of an analyzer, which depends both on the abstract as well as
the concrete domain of values, as a simple extension of the veriﬁcation conditions
generated from the axiomatic semantics of a programming language.
Proof Carrying Code (PCC) [32] is a technique aimed at assuring correctness
of external code to be run in some runtime environment. The technique collects
proof obligations from the code with respect to some safety policy, which is
comprised of rules and procedure interfaces. These veriﬁcation conditions are
assembled with the code and must ascertain its correctness. The host system
uses a simple and eﬃcient oracle (a decision-procedure in the VC object logic)
to check the validity of the proof shipped with the program to be run. The
soundness of the proof system assures that if the proof is valid than the external
code is guaranteed to execute without violating the policy. Our system follows
a similar approach where the safety policy is drawn from the axioms of units of
measurement. However, our major purpose is not certiﬁcation of mobile code.
MetaGen [8], an extension of the MixGen [7] extension of Java, provides
languages features which allow the speciﬁcation of dimension and unit informa-
tion for object-oriented programs. While distinctive in being a solution targeting
object-oriented languages with nominal typing, it follows in the footsteps of a
number of other approaches making use of language and type system extensions,
such as work on ML [25], Pascal [19, 24], and Ada [20]. In our case, we do not
extend either the language or the type system, instead making use of annotations
to indicate unit constraints.
